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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
decision, the president and general manager of an ice manufac-
turing corporation, authorized to contract for the sale of its pro-
duct, may bind the corporation by a stipulation for liquidated
damages in the event of the corporation's non-performance of its
obligations under the contract. Third persons are entitled to rely
on a corporation's general officer having authority to enter into
contracts in the usual course of business and certainly stipula-
tions for liquidated damages must be frequent in contracts for
the delivery of ice. The same result would follow under ordi-
nary agency law, Article 3000 of the Civil Code providing that
the authority of agents may be inferred from their functions or
the ordinary course of the business to which they are devoted.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
Despite the criticism that has been levelled at the doctrine
of lesion beyond moiety the court demonstrated in Jones v. First
National Bank, Ruston,1 that the opportunity it affords for pro-
tecting a vendor of real property who transfers his title thereto
for less than one-half its actual value is not to be lightly surrend-
ered. The case did not involve an ordinary sale of the property
but a dation en paiement in satisfaction of a judgment. The posi-
tion of the transferee was that, under the provisions of Louisi-
ana Civil Code Articles 1861 and 1863, a dation en paiement of
immovable property is not subject to the doctrine of lesion beyond
moiety, and that in any event the value of the land for oil, gas
and mineral purposes cannot be considered in arriving at the
true value of the property. In rejecting the latter contention the
court was able to clear up certain misconceptions stemming from
the case of Wilkins v. Nelson2 and resulting in a holding by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Silbernagel v. Harrell3 that the
court declared unsound. The opinion pointed out the obvious dif-
ference between the sale of a mineral right, a contract speculative
by its very nature and covering an immovable by disposition of
law to which the code does not extend the protection of the
action of lesion, and the sale of property the value of which is
enhanced by the possibility of profitable mineral development.
In finding a transfer of real property in the form of a dation
en paiement to be subject to the action, the court merely pointed
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 41 So.(2d) 811 (La. 1949).
2. 155 La. 807, 99 So. 607 (1924).
3. 18 La. App. 536, 138 So. 713 (1932).
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to Civil Code Article 2659 which provides that the giving in pay-
ment is subject to all of the rules governing ordinary contracts
of sale.
Justice Hawthorne wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion, takingl
the position that Articles 1861 and 1863 make it clear that the
action of lesion does not apply to a giving in payment. This ques-
tion, as to which differing opinions have been expressed, will be
considered in detail in a later issue of this review. In passing,
it is of interest to notice that Title VII, Of Sale, is made up of
thirteen chapters, and that Chapter 13 is headed "Of the Giving
in Payment," thus treating the giving in payment as a particular
kind of sale. If lesion beyond moiety is founded on the idea of im-
plied error or imposition, the possibility thereof might indeed be
graver where a debtor is transferring his property as a means of
satisfying his debts than where an owner of property is making
an ordinary sale. The suggestion that, in the former case, all
the debtor has to do to protect himself is to refrain from making
the dation and let his property be seized is not convincing. For
that matter all the vendor has to do is not make an ordinary sale,
but offer at auction.
In Brasher v. City of Alexandria,4 the court, on rehearing, re-
versed itself and held a sewer contractor obligated to furnish con-
crete cradles necessary to stabilize certain portions of the line as a
consequence of a soft subsoil, the existence of which was unfore-
seen. The case reduces itself to the proposition that a contract
capable of performance must be performed notwithstanding that
the cost may be greater than anticipated, unless the additional
cost is occasioned by the insufficiency of plans and specifications
furnished by the other party and warranted to be sufficient.
Failure of a condition on which the transfer was made was
given as the court's primary reason for annulling a deed convey-
ing a mineral interest to the defendant attorney as a contingent
fee for securing cancellation of a mineral lease for non-payment
of delay rentals. It appeared that a suit to cancel the lease was
filed but was abandoned upon the discovery that the rentals,
contrary to the belief of the mineral lessor, had been paid.5 The
court also said that there was error as to the principal cause
which nullified the contract. Three of the justices concurred in
the decree. Justice McCaleb filed a concurring opinion disagree-
ing with the finding of error and preferring to rest the decision
4. 41 So.(2d) 819 (La. 1949).
5. Cheramie v. Stiles, 41 So.(2d) 502 (La. 1949).
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on the ground that the attorney was not entitled to the interest
conveyed because the conveyance was contingent upon his secur-
ing a cancellation of the lease.
In Tennant v. Russell,0 the court dismissed a suit wherein the
plaintiff was seeking to set aside a partition between husband and
wife on the theory that he had a vested interest in the property
as a consequence of an agreement with the wife on a contingent
fee basis for the annulment of a notarial partition. The court
pointed out that the contract for the bringing of the annulment
action did not give the attorney a vested interest in the subject
matter of the suit, and that since the client had terminated the
action against her husband, as she was legally privileged to do,
the attorney's only recourse was through recovery on the basis of
quantum meruit.
After finding in Sugar Field Oil Company v. Carter7 that
there was insufficient evidence to establish an agreement to pay
a broker's commission, the court permitted the broker to recover
on a quantum meruit for services rendered in bringing a pros-
pective purchaser of certain property and the defendant together,
the latter having profited to the extent of $75,000.00 paid for an
unexercised option to purchase the property.
The court also held that, since the claim in a suit on quantum
meruit becomes liquidated only with the rendition of judgment,
interest could be allowed only from such date.
The only issue presented in Hinterlang v. Usners was whether
the defendants had been induced by fraud to purchase a certain
business from the plaintiff. The court did not believe that the
defense had been established, a view amply supported by the
record.
Tarver v. Allaun9 involved the question of whether the plain-
tiff vendor was entitled to $500.00 that had been placed in escrow
by defendant vendee, as option money for the purchase by defend-
ant of certain mineral leases on the condition that if he elected
to purchase the money was to be returned. The evidence being
that the defendant had not elected to purchase the property, the
court properly gave judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with
the contract.
Only a question of fact was presented to the court in Brezner
6. 214 La. 1046, 39 So.(2d) 726 (1949).
7. 214 La. 586, 38 So.(2d) 249 (1949).
8. 41 So.(2d) 455 (La. 1949).
9. 41 So.(2d) 71 (La. 1949).
[VOL. X
1950] WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT 175
v. B. & T. Lumber Company, 0 and this was resolved against the
plaintiff who was seeking to recover an amount allegedly loaned
to defendant, it appearing that the plaintiff had merely made
payments to defendant on a contract to purchase lumber.
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
Construction on River Bank
Article 455 of the Civil Code provides that the use of the
banks of navigable rivers is public, and the courts have enjoined
owners from putting up constructions on such property." At the
same time, the codifiers recognized the probability of structures
actually being placed on the river bank because they included two
articles for the purpose of dealing with these situations. Article
8612 provides for the removal of the construction if it "obstructs
or embarrasses" the use of the river bank; Article 8623 permits
the construction to remain if it "merely encroach upon the public
way" and if its removal would cause signal damage to the
owner. The choice between the prohibitive and the permissive
rules is frequently and necessarily left to the court. In the case
of Town of Madisonville v. Dendinger4 the court applied the per-
missive rule of Article 862 so as to leave a private warehouse
which was located on the riparian property and extended across
the river bank. In the present state of the jurisprudence, it is
10. 214 La. 1016, 39 So.(2d) 598 (1949).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Town of Napoleonville v. Boudreaux, 142 So. 874 (La. App. 1932). For
fuller discussion, see Note (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 542. Cf. Pizanie v.
Gauthreaux, 173 La. 737, 138 So. 650 (1931).
2. Art. 861, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Works which have been formerly built
on public places, or in the beds of rivers or navigable streams, or on their
banks, and which obstruct or embarrass the use of these places, rivers,
streams, or their banks, may be destroyed at the expense of those who claim
them, at the instance of the corporation of the place, or of any individual of
full age residing in the place where they are situated.
"And the owner of these works can not prevent their being destroyed
under pretext of any prescription or possession, even immemorial, which he
may have had of it, if it be proved that at the time these works were con-
structed, the soil on which they are built was public, and has not ceased to be
so since."
3. Art. 862, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If the works, formerly constructed on
the public soil, consist of houses or other buildings, which can not be de-
stroyed, without causing signal damage to the owner of them, and if these
houses or other buildings merely encroach upon the public way, without pre-
venting its use, they shall be permitted to remain, but the owner shall be
bound, when he rebuilds them, to relinquish that part of the soil or of the
public way, upon which they formerly stood."
4. 214 La. 593, 38 So.(2d) 252 (1948). See fuller discussion in Note (1949)
9 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 542.
